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CHAPTER 1.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict is a global phenomenon that can have negative outcomes if it is not properly 
managed. It can hamper the development of nations and lead to destruction and abject 
poverty especially if it takes place at national and international level. Several countries in 
Africa are known to have been in conflict for decades. The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Ivory Cost, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia are some of those 
countries that have experienced conflict at a large scale. The Sudan, a country on which 
this treatise is based, is one of the countries that have been in civil war for the past fifty 
years (Atta el-Battahani in Simmons and Dixon 2006:10). The Republic of South Africa 
has, since the first democratic elections in 1994, started to reintegrate into international 
politics. Some of the obligations that faced the Republic of South Africa are to assist in 
providing resources like troops, police, food, and other humanitarian aid to the conflict 
areas especially in the African continent. The South African Police Service (SAPS), has 
also joined other police agencies in providing peacekeepers to the African Union (AU) 
and the United Nations (UN), to assist in peacekeeping. To that effect, the SAPS has, 
since 2005, started to contribute its peacekeepers to the former African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) and the current United Nations Hybrid Mission in Sudan (UNAMID).  
 
1.2.   PROBLEM STATEMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The focus of this research will be on the question as to whether the South African Police 
Service adequately prepares its police officials for the functions they will be performing 
in Sudan: Darfur. This broad question leads to further questions that include the 
following:  
 
 What are the peacekeeping recruitment and selection criteria for the South 
African Police Service members who need to be deployed in Sudan: Darfur? 
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 Is the South African Police Service peacekeeping training curriculum adequate 
enough to prepare its members for their deployment in Sudan: Darfur? 
 
 Does the South African Police Service have any measures to evaluate the role 
played by its members in Sudan: Dafur? 
 
 What measures have been introduced to utilise the new skills brought by members 
that have been deployed? 
 
 Are there any properly posted members with mission experience, who are capable 
of presenting and further developing peacekeeping training in the South African 
Police Service? 
 
 Does the South African Police Service senior management have knowledge of 
generic peacekeeping concepts?  
 
The abovementioned questions necessitated the formulation of the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The recruitment and selection criteria for the South African Police Service 
are not clear and aligned with the activities that have to be conducted 
thereafter. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The SAPS peacekeeping curriculum is not adequate enough to prepare its 
 members in Sudan, Darfur. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There are no measures in place to evaluate SAPS members’ role in Sudan, 
Darfur. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Lack of recognition of new skills and experiences learned from the 
peacekeeping mission frustrates members who have returned from Sudan, 
Darfur. 
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Hypothesis 5: Members with mission experience are not further developed and posted as 
trainers in peacekeeping to share their experiences with their colleagues who need 
to be deployed to peacekeeping missions. 
 
Hypothesis 6: SAPS senior managers (at Provincial and Divisional levels) have limited 
knowledge of peacekeeping.      
 
1.3.   RESEARCH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
The goal of this research is to determine whether the South African Police Service 
adequately prepares its members before they leave for the peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur and whether they get support from their employer upon arrival in the mission. The 
research goal is operationalised by the following objectives:   
 
Objective 1.   To determine whether the South African Police Service has a set of 
internal policy guidelines on peacekeeping. 
 
Objective 2. To determine whether the South African Police Service adequately trains 
its peacekeepers before they are deployed. 
 
Objective 3. To recommend measures that can be put in place to align recruitment, 
selection, training and deployment of members.  
 
1.4.   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The conceptual framework provides a clear understanding to the primary concepts that 
are intended to be used in this study. Clarification of the concepts will also assist the 
reader to understand the context within which the concepts are used in this study.  
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1.4.1.  Peacekeeping  
According to the International Peace Academy peacekeeping refers to the prevention, 
moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of 
peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using 
multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace 
(Siekmann 1991:6). 
 
Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs defined 
peacekeeping as field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of 
the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United 
Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and 
with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them acting 
impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary (Cilliers 
and Mills 1995:11).       
 
1.4.2.   Peace building  
Peace building is generally defined as any actions undertaken by the UN in a conflict 
situation that are aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem, so as to prevent a re-
occurrence of the conflict once the UN presence is scaled down or phased-out (De 
Coning and Henderson 2006:21). 
 
1.4.3.   Peace enforcement 
According to Furley and May (1998:4) peace enforcement refers to the intervention of 
troops from an external state or states into a situation of conflict with the purpose of 
imposing peace.  
 
1.4.4.   Conflict resolution  
According to Burton (1990:2) conflict resolution refers to the transformation of 
relationships in a particular case by the solution of the problems that led to the conflict 
behaviour in the first place. 
 
 5 
1.4.5.   Training  
Training refers to a systematic and planned process to change the knowledge, skills and 
behaviour in such a way that organisational objectives are achieved ( Erasmus and Van 
Dyk 1999:2)  
 
1.4.6.  Mediation  
According to Moore (1996:14) mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation 
by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-
making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually 
acceptable settlement of issues in dispute. 
 
1.4.7.   Culture  
According to Edelstein, Ito and Kepplinger (1989:33) culture refers to understanding that 
has been generated among individuals and groups about the nature of human 
relationships, how those relationships were established and the social outcomes that are 
predicted for its members.  
 
1.5. LAYOUT OF THE RESEARCH      
 
This research comprises of seven chapters that entail specific background on each 
chapter. Chapter one entails an overview of the research. It provides the reader with a 
synopsis of the purpose of the research and the scope of the research. Chapter two 
focuses on the historical background of peacekeeping and its development since the 
establishment of the United Nations (UN), the growing complexities of peacekeeping 
after the end of the Cold War in 1989 and also the background on the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). Chapter two also provides the 
problem statement, hypotheses, and the conceptual framework of this research. Chapter 
three focuses on research methodology and entails key steps in research design. These 
include choice of the target population, sampling, data collection and ethical 
considerations in scientific research.  
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The review of literature pertaining to peacekeeping and peace support operations is 
covered in chapter four of this research. This includes the nature of peacekeeping 
operations, legal framework of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and also the selection and training 
of peacekeepers. Chapter five focuses on the deployment of the South African Police 
Service members in Darfur, Sudan. This chapter covers the selection and training of the 
SAPS members before they leave for Sudan, their deployment in Darfur and their return 
and roles after completion of the mission. Chapter six focuses on presentation and 
interpretation of data. It entails data presentation tables and the interpretation of the data 
collected during this research. Research findings and recommendations are covered in 
chapter seven of this research.                 
  
1.6. CONCLUSION   
         
The chapter provided the hypotheses that give clear scope within which this research is 
conducted, the goal and the objectives of this study. This chapter also provided a 
conceptual framework that will assist the reader to understand the context within which 
the concepts are used. Finally this chapter provided the layout of the chapters of the 
research and what they entail. Chapter two will provide a historical background to 
peacekeeping in the context of this research.         
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PEACEKEEPING   
 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
     
Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the Republic of South Africa faced major 
obligations that were performed by most states in the international global arena. These 
obligations include, amongst others, rejoining the United Nations (UN) and the former 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the deployment of peacekeepers to various 
peacekeeping missions to assist in conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. 
International conflicts date back for centuries but the purpose of this treatise is not to give 
the history of such conflicts, but rather to present the realities that are of significance in 
peacekeeping including the conflict in Sudan: Darfur on which this treatise is focusing. In 
order to streamline these realities into their proper context it is sufficient to go back in 
time as far as the First World War. The First World War formally ended with the Treaty 
of Versailles concluded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (de Rover 1998:69). This 
treaty created the League of Nations and the International Labour Office. The main aim 
of the League was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international 
peace and security”. The League of Nations failed to achieve this aim due to the apathy 
and reluctance of the member States rather than the apparent inadequacies of the treaty 
provisions (de Rover 1998:70). The League of Nations failed to prevent the Second 
World War and it was dissolved on the 18th of April 1946 after the establishment of the 
United Nations on the 24th of October 1945. In June 1945, fifty governments participated 
in the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter is the multilateral treaty 
that sets out the legal rights and duties of the UN member states. According to Article 1 
of the UN Charter the purposes of the United Nations are: to maintain international peace 
and security, to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion (de Rover 1998:73).  
 8 
The prime concern of the United Nations is international peace and security. For the 
United Nations to succeed in that endeavour, it depended on effective cooperation among 
member States in contributing the necessary resources for the overall accomplishment of 
its aims and objectives. Such resources include soldiers, police officials, financial 
support, equipment and other resources that would be of relevance in a given mission. 
The UN Charter contains three critical chapters that have a serious impact on the nature 
of the mandates that are given to the peacekeeping missions. Interestingly, nowhere in the 
UN Charter does the name peacekeeping or peace enforcement appear. These words were 
used during the early traditional missions that were conducted by the United Nations in 
the first three decades after its existence. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are 
implied from the chapters of the UN Charter.   
 
Chapter VI, on peacekeeping, deals with pacific measures that can be taken with the 
consent of the belligerents (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004:46). According to 
Article 33(1), these measures include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements. Under this 
chapter peacekeepers are given a limited mandate to perform their duties. They are 
restricted to observation, monitoring reporting and advising as required by the mandate as 
prescribed by the United Nations under this chapter.   Chapter VII, peace enforcement, 
entails a broad variety of actions that can enforce peace which include the use of force. 
Under this mandate, no consent is required for the implementation of a mission. Under 
this chapter the police are armed and are given full responsibility of law enforcement. On 
the other hand the military is not only restricted to offer protection to civilians, they are 
authorized to use force in separating parties to the conflict and also assist in law 
enforcement. Collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping 
is envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Zacarias 1996:104). Under this chapter 
the UN Charter gives authority to regional organizations like the African Union (AU), 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to 
independently carry out peace settlement initiatives in their regions.  
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This arrangement is conditional and this Chapter stipulates that it should only be used 
under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This implies that 
the region will have to seek authorization from the UNSC before it takes any action 
against the breach of peace. An exception can be taken if the threat is imminent and lives 
can be lost while waiting for authorization. According to Shimura in Thakur and 
Schnabel (2001:47) the first Peacekeeping Operation, the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), had its origin in a cease-fire that was achieved in the 
first Middle East war in 1948. This operation consisted of contributions of officers from 
Belgium, France and the United States of America. The United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization was the birth of what is known as peacekeeping today. 
Traditional peacekeeping involved fighting between two or more countries and 
peacekeepers would be deployed to separate them either through drawing a ceasefire line 
or deploying in a buffer zone to keep the combatants at a healthy distance from each 
other. The job of peacekeepers was not difficult as such because they knew who the 
parties to the conflict were and their duties focused mainly on separating them. These 
classical conflicts were mainly interstate in nature. This implies that they involved 
conflict between two or more states for one reason or another. A practical example of this 
type of interstate conflict is a war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland 
Islands in the early 1980’s. Another similar example of two states caught up in warfare 
even today, are between Ethiopia and Eretrea over a piece of land that both countries 
claim belongs to them. In this type of conflict parties are clearly identifiable and the 
reasons for the conflict are clearly articulated.  
 
Peacekeeping missions or peace support operations were minimal during their early 
evolution. Few missions were experienced due to the tension that existed between the 
east and the west during the cold war period. It was during this time that traditional 
peacekeeping missions of the kind mentioned above, were evident and the United 
Nations had no serious in-mission challenges of dealing with parties to the conflict until 
in 1989 when the cold war was officially ended.  After the cold war the nature of 
peacekeeping changed due to the dynamics of conflicts. Conflicts were no longer taking 
place between states. They were, in fact, within states or they were intrastate conflicts.            
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According to Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:130) civilians are the targets in 
these wars, not accidental victims. They further indicate that in the First World War, over 
80 per cent of battlefield deaths were combatants; by the 1990s over 90 per cent of war- 
related deaths are civilians, killed in their own homes and communities, which have 
become the battlefields of international-social wars. It was no longer easy to keep the 
peace like during the traditional peacekeeping days where it was clear who the enemy 
was and exactly where the borders of each state were situated. Miall et al (1999:128), 
further indicate that these wars often persists for years, causing untold human suffering, 
but only sporadically catching the attention of the international community at large.  The 
real victims of these conflicts are women, children and other vulnerable groups that have 
no means of protecting themselves against the parties to the conflict.  Traditional 
peacekeeping or first generation peacekeeping as it is known, was no longer relevant to 
this type of conflict.  
 
The ‘second generation’ was distinct from the first generation of traditional peacekeeping 
because such operations tended to take place within states, rather than between them, and 
in an environment where the interposition of the blue helmets (United Nations 
peacekeepers) between organized belligerents was either not possible or ineffective 
(Bellamy et al 2004:129). Peacekeeping operations started to be wider and involved 
parties to the conflict introduced a new component of civilians who had a specific role to 
play in the peacebuilding processes. In addition to the traditional military functions, the 
peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a 
long-term settlement of the underlying conflict (Chayes and Chayes 1996:484). On the 
other hand, third generation peacekeeping is characterized by peace-enforcement. This 
entails enforcement of ceasefire agreements and the protection of humanitarian actors in 
the mission environment. The increasing complexity of peacekeeping continued   until 
the advent of the current multidimensional and multidisciplinary peace support operations 
that are referred to as the sixth generation of peacekeeping. Currently the UN, together 
with other regional organizations, deals with complex peacekeeping or peace support 
operations that are multidimensional, and that require well trained peacekeepers who 
understand the nature of today’s conflicts as compared to the traditional peacekeepers. 
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Figure 1.1 below illustrates the peacekeeping missions since the first mission in 1948 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Aboagye and Kent 2005:05). It also 
depicts the rapid increase in the number of such missions after the end of the cold war to 
indicate the change from interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts that changed the face of 
peacekeeping from traditional buffering or separating roles, to complex and 
multidimensional peace support operations.       
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: UN peacekeeping missions since 1948. 
 
 
In addition to the synopsis of the establishment of the United Nations and its shortened 
version of its peacekeeping missions, a regional organisation from the African continent 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on the 25th May 1963 
(Aboagye et al 2005:22). They identified the following purposes of the OAU: 
 
 To promote unity and solidarity of the African states,  
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 To coordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to better life for the 
peoples of Africa,  
 To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member 
States. 
 To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and  
 To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.     
 
After the first democratic elections of the Republic of South Africa in 1994 and the 
severe conflict that surfaced on the African continent, the OAU was not particularly 
successful in achieving its goals. According to Aboagye et al (2005:22), some of the 
reasons for this lack of success included principle of non-interference in the affairs of 
other member states, absence of a substantive security mechanism, lack of capacity and 
institutional expertise and the perceived and real reluctance of the UN and the 
international community to fully commit themselves to the resolution of destabilising 
conflicts. The end of the cold war and economic changes that coincided with that era, led 
to the African Heads of state to underscore the need to act quickly and determinedly to 
forestall devastating African conflicts. Thus, after thirty years of existence of the OAU, 
its leadership recognized the need to transform the organization and to ensure that the 
newly established entity would be able to address the newly identified challenges. These 
challenges, together with the Rwandan genocide in 1994, led to the establishment of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union in Togo and the subsequent launch of the African 
Union in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa.   
In the area of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, collaboration between the 
African Union and the United Nations continued in increase (Aboagye et al 2005:30). 
The establishment of the United Nations Liaison Offices in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, in 
2002, constitutes a significant part of the framework for the cooperation and 
collaboration; especially in conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations. The United 
Nations has mandated several peacekeeping operations that were conducted by the 
African Union under chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which makes provision for regional 
arrangements.  
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These include, amongst others, Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2003, the ECOWAS Mission in 
Liberia (ECOMIL) in 2003 and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. 
The cooperation and collaboration of these two bodies assisted in expediting the 
deployment of peacekeepers in some of the operations on the African Continent that were 
later handed over to the United Nations. These arrangements are carried out through 
various legal instruments that have to be signed and finalised for the authorisation of an 
operation in any part of the world. Thus it is not possible for a country to enter into the 
territory of another country without due authorisation of such entry by the United 
Nations. The invasion of Iraq by the United States of America falls under the category of 
such unauthorised entries by one country into the territory of another for the purpose of 
what was perceived by the United States of America to be justified and legal.               
 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is one of the peacekeeping missions that are 
conducted under the auspices of the African Union. According to Kindiki (2007:3) 
Darfur is Sudan’s largest region, situated on its western border with Libya, Chad and the 
Central African Republic. It comprises of an area of approximately 250 000 square 
kilometres (size of France) with a population of approximately 6 million people. African 
farmers, such as the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes predominate in Darfur. The rest of 
the population consists of nomadic Arab tribes (Kindiki 2007:3). Two main issues have 
driven the conflict in Darfur. The first is the ethnic division between the Government of 
Sudan and the non-Arab African communities in Darfur, which has led the Government 
of Sudan to support the Arab groups in the region. The second is an age-old economic 
competition between the nomadic Arab herdsmen and the farmers of the African tribes 
over land use and water. For the conflict to reach the magnitude it reached in 2003, it was 
fuelled by the incidents that took place some years before. Lack of trust between the 
government-favoured Arabs and the African communities in Darfur was exacerbated 
when the former government of Sadiq El Mahdi (1986 – 1989) adopted a policy of 
arming the Arab militias known as the muraheleen, also known as Janjaweed, and using 
them as a counterinsurgency force against the southern Sudan-based rebels.  
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After a coup that took place in 1989, the new government incorporated the muraheleen 
into the Popular Defence Forces and paramilitaries, who have been involved in the 
attacks against African communities in Darfur. The sharpest escalation of the violence in 
the decade from 1997 to 2007 took place in 2003. The government of Sudan is believed 
to have backed the Janjaweed (as a government underground force), similar militias and 
related predecessors in vicious attacks on the local villagers. These attacks led the local 
militants to organize their own armed rebel groups, notably Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLA and JEM groups accused 
the Government of Sudan of decades of neglecting and oppressing blacks in favour of the 
Arabs. They also demanded that the Government of Sudan address the perceived political 
marginalization, socio-economic neglect and discrimination against African Darfurians. 
In response to the rebellion the Government of Sudan allegedly sponsored the Janjaweed 
aggression (Kindiki 2007:4).      
 
With active government support the Janjaweed attacked villages, systematically targeting 
civilian communities that share the same ethnicity with the rebel groups, killing, looting, 
displacing and polluting water supplies. Marong (2007:1) also confirms the activities of 
the Janjaweed as exacerbating the conflict in Darfur. He indicates that the conflict in 
Darfur is further complicated by the existence of and active involvement of a 
government-sponsored Arab militia called the Janjaweed which fights alongside the 
government troops. There is overwhelming evidence that the Government of Sudan is 
responsible for recruiting, arming and participating in joint attacks with the militia forces 
that have become the main instrument for attacks on, and the displacement of the civilian 
population (Kindiki 2007:4). The current estimates of the number of deaths during the 
two years range from 200 000 to 500 000. The international response so far has failed to 
stop the killings, protect the civilians or ensure accountability. Despite a ceasefire 
agreement and other agreement brokered and monitored by the African Union between 
the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, the Government of Sudan-backed militia 
continue in their offensive bombing of civilians and rebel targets especially in South 
Darfur.  
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After lengthy negotiations, the Government of Sudan consented to the deployment of  
1 200 African Union troops in 2004 with the mandate to observe the ceasefire, report on 
violations and protect civilians. This was done under the African Union Mission in Sudan 
as it is known today. Although the number of peacekeepers has risen to 7 000 over time, 
logistics and their inability to implement their mandate have been major problems 
associated with the African Union peacekeepers with an approximate 1500 police officers 
on the ground in Darfur. In the face of overwhelming evidence, the Government of Sudan 
is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens (Kindiki 2007:5). The Darfur conflict is 
further exacerbated by attacks on African Union peacekeepers that are killed by faceless 
“gunmen” in the region. It was an open secret that the African Union Mission in Sudan 
was unable to protect its own peacekeepers due to the restrictive Chapter VI mandate of 
the UN Charter and the limited arms and ammunition of the peacekeepers.  
 
Furthermore chronic lack of expertise, inadequate equipment and insufficient funds to 
pay for its air wing were some of the internal challenges of the AMIS. These challenges 
and the reluctance of the Sudanese Government to allow the deployment of the United 
Nations Peacekeepers in Darfur, elongated the period of suffering and killing of innocent 
civilians in this region. Ultimately, after long negotiations with the Sudanese President, 
Omar El Bashir, the Government of Sudan agreed to the deployment of the United 
Nations / African Union Hybrid Mission in Dafur (UNAMID). UNAMID was established 
under Resolution 1769 of the United Nations Security Council that spells out the new 
mandate of the mission. UNAMID officially took the reigns from AMIS on the 1st of 
January 2008 in what was seen as an uncertain start of the mission. The mandate has been 
elevated to a robust Chapter VII of the UN Charter that authorizes peacekeepers to use 
force if necessary during the tour of their duties. This includes police officers being 
authorised to do normal policing functions like crime prevention, investigation and also 
arresting of suspects. However the challenges of logistics and force generation are still 
unresolved due to lack of support from the UN / AU member States. This also led to slow 
deployment of additional peacekeepers that were pledged by the member states in support 
of peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur.  
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The Sudanese Government also complicated the scenario by specifying the types of 
weapons peacekeepers had to carry. Peacekeepers were only allowed to carry light 
weapons like assault riffles and hand guns even if there are rebels are still driving through 
Darfur carrying light machine guns, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft machine guns. This 
is a scene where the South African Police Service members are deployed alongside other 
military and police forces with an endeavour to bring peace in the war torn Darfur.           
 
2.2.   CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter provided historical background on the evolution of peacekeeping. It 
provided the history of peacekeeping from the beginning of the League of Nations until 
the current period of multidimensional peacekeeping. This chapter also provided a 
background to the former Organisation of African Unity and the African Union. 
Furthermore the chapter provided the brief background of the conflict in Sudan, Darfur 
and the attempts made by the African Union Mission in Sudan to resolve the conflict.  
The next chapter focuses on research methodology and it will entail the discussion on 
research design, target population, sampling, data collection and research ethics.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The research methodology that a researcher follows is very important because it provides 
guidelines on how data is supposed to be collected. According to Babbie and Mouton 
(1998:49) the selection of methods and their application, are always dependent on the 
aims and objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and 
the underlying theory or expectations of the investigator. Three broad methodological 
paradigms have dominated the scene in recent social research: the qualitative, 
quantitative and participatory action paradigms. For the purpose of this study, a 
quantitative approach will be used because of the nature of the data and the methods that 
are going to be used in collecting it. According to Mouton and Marais (1990:150) the 
quantitative approach is more highly formalized as well as more explicitly controlled, 
with a range that is more exactly defined and which, in terms of the methods used, is 
relatively close to that of the physical sciences. This is because historically, the 
quantitative approach has its origin and influences from the positivistic metatheory of 
social sciences.             
 
According to Mouton and Marais (1991:42) the following are the three types of studies in 
scientific research. 
 
 Exploratory studies. 
 The goal of exploratory studies is to explore something that is new or unknown     
to the researcher or the researcher has little or no knowledge about. This might be 
a new invention or a new topic in a particular field of study.  
 Descriptive studies. 
Descriptive studies are very specific in their aim and are intended to observe and 
report a particular phenomenon. 
 Explanatory studies.  
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According to Mouton and Marais (1991:45) the aim of explanatory studies is to explain a 
given phenomenon in terms of specific causes. This study is descriptive because it aims 
to describe the process that the South African Police Service takes in recruiting its 
incumbent peacekeepers until they are deployed and finish their mission period and come 
back home.    
  
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In order to arrive at a particular conclusion, research has to be planned in order to have a 
clear direction. Research design consists of a blueprint of the process that the researcher 
will undergo from the beginning to the end of the research. The following were identified 
as key steps in this study: choice of the target population, sampling, data collection and 
ethical considerations in this study.  
 
3.2.1.  Target population 
According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1981:294) a population is the aggregate of all 
cases that conform to some designated set of specifications. For the purposes of this study 
the target population refers to all members of the South African Police Service who are 
already in a database of members who have already served in the African Union Mission 
in Sudan. The South African Police Service has already had four hundred and twenty 
seven members that have already completed their mission period in Sudan. These are the 
SAPS members that serve as a target group for this study.        
 
3.2.2.  Sampling     
According to Leary (1991:82) sampling refers to the process by which a researcher 
selects a sample of subjects from the population of interest. The target population is 
heterogeneous and consists of males and females from various divisions and components 
of the South African Police Service. They come from various parts of the country and are 
of various ranks ranging from Constable to Senior Superintendent. They are of various 
ages and races.  
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The sampling method that is used in this research is non-probability sampling. According 
to Huysamen (1994:43) the probability that a given element of the population will be 
included in the non-probability sample cannot be specified.  
In this research purposive sample is used to obtain the relevant sample. In this type of 
sampling researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity and / or previous research 
findings to deliberately obtain participants in such a manner that the sample obtained may 
be regarded as representative of the relevant population (Huysamen 1994:44). In this 
instance the researcher has been employed as a police officer for the past seventeen years 
and has worked on peacekeeping since 1999, long before the South African Police 
Service started deploying its members to Darfur, in Sudan. Based on the understanding of 
the researcher purposive sampling is relevant in this regard.    
 
The sample that is used in this research is going to be the SAPS members who are in the 
mission in Dafur, Sudan on the 26th of September 2007. A total number of forty-two (42) 
officers will be coming back from the mission on the 26th of September and an additional 
number of thirty (30) officers will be remaining in Darfur and coming back to South 
Africa in November 2007.  The researcher has access to all these officers and they will be 
used to provide valuable inputs to this research project. The SAPS has a total number of 
four hundred and twenty-seven members who have been to the mission thus far. This 
number is not inclusive of those that will be returning at the end of November 2007.   
 
3.2.3.  Data collection 
Since the nature of this study is quantitative, a comprehensive questionnaire (See 
Annexure A) was developed, tested and thereafter distributed amongst the South African 
Police Service members at the African Union Mission in Sudan Headquarters in El 
Fashir, Dafur. The questionnaire covers biographical information of the respondents, 
aspects of training prior deployment, their functions during the deployment and also 
placement of SAPS members after completion of the mission. Furthermore close ended 
questions were used in the questionnaire due to the quantitative nature of this research. 
 
The variables contained in the questionnaire are the following: 
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Table 1: Questionnaire variables.  
Variable Name  
A1 Gender 
A2 Race 
A3 Age 
A4 Rank 
A5 Years of service 
A6 Educational qualifications 
B1 Voluntary deployment to the African Union Mission in Sudan 
B2 Voluntary medial tests before deployment 
B3 Clarity of the course on the functioning of the UN and the AU 
B4 Clarity of the course in dealing with human rights issues in the mission 
B5 4 x 4 skills development during the Generic Peacekeeping Course  
B6 Clarity of lectures in dealing with vulnerable groups in the mission 
B7 Humane treatment of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) by the 
Sudanese police.   
B8 The extent of the observation of practices by the Sudanese police  
B9 The extent of monitoring the activities of the Sudanese police 
B10 The extent of advising the Sudanese police  
B11 The extent of reporting misconducts, criminal activities or good practices of the 
Sudanese police.  
B12 Logistical support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur. 
B13 Social support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur.  
B14 Level of preparedness from South Africa on peacekeeping functions performed in 
Darfur.   
B15 Assessment during the Generic Peacekeeping course before deployment.   
B16 Medical testing before deployment. 
B17 Awareness on South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping deployments. 
B18 Waiting period before redeployment. 
B19 Awareness on senior management’s attendance of any peacekeeping training in South 
Africa or elsewhere.  
B20 Willingness to share peacekeeping experiences and managerial support in implementing 
such experiences.  
B21 Willingness to be redeployed if given another chance. 
B22 Value of presence in Darfur to the lives of the victims of armed conflict.  
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The information reflected on the questionnaire should be read with the attached 
questionnaire in order to be clear on what each variable relates to.    
 
3.2.4.  Research ethics  
According to Babbie et al (1998:520) ethical issues arise out of our interaction with other 
people, other beings (such as animals), and the environment, especially where there is a 
conflict of interest. Ethics play a critical role in ensuring a proper balance between the 
need to do research and the rights and entitlements that other people have. These ethical 
considerations include, amongst others, the following: anonymity and confidentiality, 
voluntary participation and no harm to participants. 
 
3.2.4.1.Voluntary participation and privacy.  
According to Huysamen (1990:178) to compel subjects to participate in a research is 
probably ethically more unacceptable than to let them participate without their 
knowledge. The respondents in this research were requested to voluntarily participate and 
no one was under undue pressure to participate.  
 
3.2.4.2.No physical or psychological harm to participants 
The researcher should ensure that under no circumstances may the participants in a 
research project be exposed to pain or discomfort. Social research should never injure the 
people being studied, regardless of whether they volunteer for the study or not (Babbie et 
al 1998:522).  The questionnaires that were distributed were developed and tested for any 
sensitive questions that could upset the respondents. 
 
3.2.4.3.Anonymity and confidentiality  
Anonymity and confidentiality are critical ethical considerations especially if the 
protection of the subjects’ interests and well-being is the protection of their identity. 
According to Vermeulen (1998:17) all participants in a research project have the right to 
remain anonymous therefore the identities of individuals should not be revealed.  
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In this study the participants did not have to provide any information that could link with 
their identities. The notes on the questionnaire indicated that participants were not 
supposed to provide their names to ensure their anonymity. Confidentiality of the data 
provided does not necessarily come into the picture because of the anonymity of the 
respondents. 
 
3.3. CONCLUSION  
 
Research methodology is a pillar of scientific research. This chapter outlined the research 
methodology in this study as quantitative in nature. The research design was also 
discussed as a blueprint or a plan on which the research is conducted. The target 
population, sampling and data collection techniques were discussed and the variables of 
the questionnaire were also outlined. Ethical considerations were also taken into 
consideration during the entire research process to ensure the integrity of the study. 
Specific considerations were made in relation to the rights to confidentiality and 
anonymity, voluntary participation and exposure to physical and psychological harm on 
the subjects of the study.      
 
The next chapter will orientate the reader on peacekeeping literature with a specific focus 
on the history of the United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations since the 
inception of the current multidimensional and complex peace support operations.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RELEVANT LITERATURE RELATING TO PEACEKEEPING 
MISSIONS AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
 
4.1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict is a global phenomenon that forms an intricate part of human existence. It is a 
critical element of development and change in all parts of the world. It is a driving force 
that ensures continuous metamorphosis of critical aspects of human existence such as 
social, political and economic aspects. At the international level, unresolved conflicts 
have serious negative outcomes that impact badly on the lives of other human beings. 
Sometimes these unresolved conflicts leave a trail of death, poverty, suffering, human 
insecurity and even a lack of respect for human dignity and life. Large-scale conflicts like 
the conflict in Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq and the recent and ongoing conflict in Somalia bear testimony to 
the devastating nature of conflict. Most of these conflicts, unlike the early conflicts that 
took place between the 1960’s and late 1980’s, are conflicts that take place within the 
borders of a particular country. According to Rankhumise (2006:1) intra-state wars and 
conflicts in Africa have created unprecedented humanitarian crises within the continent. 
This creates a challenge to the world community to quickly respond in resolving and 
preventing these conflicts due to their complexity and bureaucratic processes that have to 
be followed in resolving conflicts of this nature.   
 
The following discussion is going to focus on the legal framework of peacekeeping 
operations with specific reference to peacekeeping mandates, Status of the Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), Rules of Engagement (ROE), the roles of the civilian police and 
human rights issues. The discussion will further focus on humanitarian aspects of 
peacekeeping, cultural and gender issues, the concept of Disarmourment, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) and the personal safety of peacekeepers in the mission 
environment. The discussion will also focus on selection and training of peacekeepers 
and logistical support for the peacekeepers. The discussion will end with a 
comprehensive conclusion.           
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4.2.   NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
 
Peacekeeping has been evolving since its inception in 1948. During the Cold War era, 
conflicts were interstate in nature and the parties to the conflict were clearly identifiable. 
According to Thakur (2005:3) the goal of traditional peacekeeping missions was to 
promote international stability and support peaceful change outside the axis of great 
power rivalry. The principle of consent of the parties to the conflict to allow an 
international force to intervene in bringing peace to the warring parties has since been in 
place during classical peacekeeping. However since the end of the Cold War conflicts 
started to become intrastate in nature and this implied the need for a serious change in the 
approaches that were used by the United Nations and other regional organizations in 
addressing the conflicts that took place during the Cold War period. The number of 
United Nations operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the UN 
was placed center-stage in the efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts (Thakur 2005:4). 
The evolution of peacekeeping can be summarized in the following table that reflects the 
generation, activities and the missions that took place.     
Table 2. Evolution of peacekeeping. 
Generation of 
peacekeeping  
Purpose of peacekeeping 
operations 
Examples of Specific 
Missions where the 
operation was deployed 
First generation   Separation of combatants 
(states) by the United 
Nations mission. 
United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF) between   
Egypt and Israel   
Second generation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional range of 
functions rather only 
military interposition. 
(Conducted outside the UN 
system). 
Zimbabwe, Beirut and Sri 
Lanka. 
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Third generation  Tasks like military 
disengagements, 
demobilization and 
cantonment, policing 
human rights monitoring 
and enforcement, 
observation, organization 
and conduct of elections, 
rehabilitation and 
repatriation and 
contemporary 
administration.   
Namibia and Cambodia 
Fourth generation  Peace enforcement and 
protection of the civilians 
(Mission failed dismally 
during the Srebrenica 
killings in 1995)  
United Nations Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR) in 
former Yugoslavia  
Fifth generation  Multinational peace 
enforcement operations that 
are later taken over by the 
United Nations after they 
stabilize. (Traditional third 
generation functions mark 
this generation of 
peacekeeping operations)  
Bosnia and Haiti 
Sixth generation  A United Nations 
multinational force with a 
robust mandate. UN 
organized elections, state 
building, humanitarian aid 
and rule of law.     
East Timor  
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After the increase in the number of peace support operations at the end of the Cold War 
(after 1989), there was no policy developed that served as a guide for the new and 
complex United Nations missions. This compelled the United Nations to do some 
introspection on its peacekeeping operations to ensure that there would be improvements 
in future operations. According to Thakur (2005:5) the former United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan appointed a high-level international panel, chaired by former 
Algerian foreign minister (and subsequently special UN envoy to Afghanistan and the 
Iraq) Lakhdar Brahimi, to make recommendations for the changes in UN peacekeeping. 
The report came to the conclusion that “when the United Nations does send its forces to 
uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and 
violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. Some of the changes that were 
brought about by the Brahimi report were:  
• An increment of staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to 
support field missions,  
• Bolstering of the offices of the military and the police advisers,  
• A lessons learnt unit was restructured into the best practices unit and the DPKO’s 
logistics component situated in Brindisi (Italy) received funding to acquire 
strategic deployment stocks.   
• The police commissioner was no longer supposed to report to the military force 
commander, but to be at the same level as the force commander and both had to 
report to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General.  
These steps constituted the United Nations internal transformation activities that were 
intended to bring the peacekeeping missions into line with the nature of the new conflicts, 
in order to better respond to them after the cold war.  These developments within the 
United Nations system had a serious influence on the way peacekeeping should be 
performed by the regional organizations. According to De Coning (2006:6) over the past 
half decade, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) like the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace 
operations.  
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The African Union, in particular, has played a leading role by deploying its first two 
peace operations in Burundi; the African Union Missions in Burundi (AMIB) and Sudan 
(African Union Mission in Sudan). A natural sequence that has evolved, and has already 
been seen to be working is that the regional organizations and the African Union would 
first deploy in a conflict area and later the United Nations would take over the complex 
operations and ensure that they are properly managed and supported. According to De 
Coning (2006:6) this pattern was established in Burundi, where the African Union 
deployed AMIB in 2003 followed by a UN operation (ONUB) (United Nations Operation 
in Burundi) in 2004; and repeated in Liberia where ECOWAS deployed ECOMIL 
(ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) in 2003, followed by a UN operation (United Nations 
Mission in Liberia) later in the same year; and it is also the case with Darfur where the 
African Union Mission in Sudan was first established in 2004 and has since been 
replaced by the United Nations African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  
 
4.3.   LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
 
Peacekeeping and peace support operations, by their nature, operate within a strict legal 
framework that is derived from various components of international law. The legal 
framework covers the United Nations Charter that serves as a basis for the United 
Nations functioning. The United Nations Charter has three chapters that provide 
guidelines on the mandates of particular peace operations. These are chapter VI, VII and 
VIII of the United Nations Charter and they will be explained below. The legal 
framework also includes various Conventions, Covenants, Memoranda of Understanding, 
Status of the Forces Agreements, national legislation, human rights law and Codes of 
conduct that require compliance by parties to the conflict and also by the peacekeepers.  
 
4.3.1.  Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Peacekeeping or pacific settlement of 
disputes). 
Chapter VI deals with pacific measures that can be taken with the consent of the 
belligerents for the purposes of peaceful settlement of disputes (Bellamy et al 2004:46).  
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According to Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, these measures include 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements. Under this chapter peacekeepers are given a limited 
mandate to perform their duties. They are restricted to what is required of them by the 
mandate as prescribed by the United Nations under this chapter. The use of force by the 
peacekeepers is restricted.  The only time when force can be used is when peacekeepers 
have to defend themselves. The nature of force to be used is prescribed under the Rules 
of Engagement (ROE) of each mission. The South African Police Service members 
formally started their first deployment in the African Union Missions in Sudan (AMIS) in 
March 2005 under a Chapter VI mandate. There were only eighteen members of the 
SAPS that were deployed during that period. The functions that peacekeepers had to 
perform from the beginning of the mission in 2004 until the 31st of December 2007 were 
restricted to Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These activities include advising the 
Government of Sudanese (GOS) Police on how they should carry out their duties, 
especially with due regard to human rights. They assist in training, monitoring and 
reporting of any or unlawful or illegal practices by the GOS Police. They are not carrying 
any side arms and they are protected by the military while they carry out their daily 
functions.  
 
The duties of the military under this Chapter are to offer protection to both the civilians 
(police included) and Military Observers (MILOBS). According to Appiah-Mensah 
(2005:12 –13) the enhanced mandate of AMIS was established by the African Union 
Peace and Security Council on 20 October 2004. This mandate was carved out with the 
assumption that the Government of Sudan will provide primary first-line protection to the 
people of Darfur and lead on compliance with the Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement 
signed in Ndjamena, Chad on the 8th of April 2004. This was not the case and the African 
Union did not change its mandate in this regard. Thus AMIS operated as an observer 
mission with a restricted mandate and limited personnel and equipment. This created 
serious challenges for the AMIS mission to provide adequate protection to the civilians 
over and above what the mandate had provided.           
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4.3.2.  Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Peace enforcement). 
Peace enforcement missions entail a broad variety of actions that can enforce peace. 
These actions include the use of force both by the military and the police in carrying out 
their functions. Under this mandate police do their normal policing functions and have 
powers to arrest, detain, do community policing, investigate, manage crowds and also 
prevent crime as opposed to the limited functions under Chapter VI of the United Nations 
Charter. Under this chapter the police are armed and are given full responsibility of law 
enforcement. On the other hand the military is not only restricted to offering protection to 
civilians, they are authorized to use force in separating parties to the conflict and also 
assist in law enforcement.  This mandate is currently implemented in UNAMID and it is 
seen to be robust enough to protect the civilians in Darfur and also for the mission to 
implement its objectives as expected by the international community. The mandate was 
put in place on the 1st of January 2008 under Resolution 1769 of the Security Council of 
the United Nations.  
 
4.3.3.  Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (Regional arrangements). 
Collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in peacekeeping is envisaged 
in UN Charter Chapter VIII (Zacarias 1996:104). The United Nations Charter gives 
authority to regional organizations like the African Union (AU), the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to 
independently carry out peace settlement initiatives in their regions. This arrangement is 
conditional and Chapter VIII stipulates that it should only be used under the authorization 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This implies that the region will have to 
seek authorization from the UNSC before it takes any action against any breach to peace 
with any state. An exception can be made if the threat is imminent and lives can be lost 
while waiting for authorization. A classical example of such situation is the response of 
ECOWAS in Liberia that was later taken over by the United Nations to become the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) was also a Chapter VIII type of an operation that functions as a Chapter VI 
mission (peacekeeping mission).  
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The United Nations gave the African Union a Security Council Resolution to carryout a 
mission in Sudan: Darfur. The Government of Sudan did not want peacekeepers from 
outside African countries to participate in the mission in Darfur, which is why the 
mission could not be a United Nations mission from the outset. However the United 
Nations took control of the mission in Darfur with effect from January 2008 with a 
Chapter VII mandate that authorises the peacekeepers to use force in performing their 
functions.    
 
4.3.4.  United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement cannot take place unless under the authority of the 
United Nations in a form of a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).  To 
launch complex operations, pre-operation fact-finding missions to the area where the 
mission is going to be held are essential to gather information to determine the nature of 
the mission to be established. However this has been seen as time wasting and escalating 
the conflict that has already started, and invites criticism of the UN’s late response to the 
missions such as it happed in Cambodia. It is true that when conflict has erupted and 
there is a need for peacekeepers, time is of the essence to ensure that lives are not lost and 
the conflict does not escalate while United Nations is still doing a feasibility study on the 
type of the operation to be established. Eventually, the Council almost always accepts the 
Secretary-General’s report and its recommendations which is compiled after fact-finding 
missions. And it normally proceeds to adopt a resolution that officially establishes the 
anticipated operation along those lines (Shimura in Thakur et al 2001:50). The resolution 
will specify the type of peace initiative (either peacekeeping or peace enforcement) that is 
authorised and entails all the parties that are going to be deployed and sets out their 
specific roles during the mission. The resolution will indicate the end state of that mission 
as prescribed by the UN Security Council.  In case of a Chapter VIII the UNSCR will 
further specify the region that it is aimed to authorize to conduct a mission, the activities 
and role players in that particular mission. The current UNAMID mission has been 
authorised under Resolution 1969 of the United Nations and stipulates precisely what the 
end state of the operation should be.   
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4.3.5. Status of the Forces  / Mission Agreement (SOFA) 
According to Mlotha in Aboagye and Kent (2005:21) the Status of the Forces / Mission  
Agreement (SOFA / SOMA) is concluded between the United Nations and the territory in 
which the mission is going to be deployed.  
The two concepts are usually used interchangeably but it should be noted that the SOMA 
applies to peacekeeping and the SOFA applies to Peace enforcement. In these agreements 
the United Nations will undertake to ensure that the peacekeepers will conduct their 
duties in full respect of the legal framework of the United Nations. Furthermore the 
SOFA / SOMA indicates that each peacekeeper is subjected to the national laws of his or 
her country during the mission period. This implies that if a peacekeeper commits an act 
that is an offence in his or her country, such peacekeeper should be repatriated from the 
mission and prosecuted for such act in his or her home country. According to Cilliers in 
Cilliers and Mills (1995:72-73), the legality of a peace support mission in any country’s 
territory should be guaranteed by a Status of Forces Agreement signed between the host 
country and the UN, regulating the following in detail: 
• Privileges and immunities of the force, officers, officials and members of he 
force. 
• Matters concerning the application of taxation, customs and fiscal regulations. 
• Communication and postal services.  
• Availability of the local currency for the use by the force. 
• Use of water, electricity and other public utilities. 
• Freedom of movement. 
• Use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields. 
• Settlement of disputes or claims. 
• Civil and criminal jurisdiction and identification and status.   
The SOFA will stipulate the jurisdiction of the mission, facilities to be used by 
peacekeepers, the rights to carry firearms and wear uniforms in a foreign country and also 
enjoy the protection and privileges such as exemption from paying tax. All peacekeepers 
enjoy their protection and privileges that are specified in the SOFA but such privileges 
could be waived if the peacekeeper commits an offence in the mission.  
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Practically the SOMA of AMIS was violated because the Sudanese authorities used to 
close the airport in El Fashir and this created serious challenges to the mission especially 
in cases of medical evacuations. AMIS would complain to the Sudanese authorities and 
the airport would be temporarily opened and closed at a later stage.   
 
4.3.6. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  
The MOU is an agreement between the United Nations or the African Union and the 
police or troop contributing country. According to Mlotha in Aboagye and Kent 
(2005:22) the MOU provides guidelines to the troop or police contributing country in 
terms of the number of peacekeepers to be contributed, the authority under which they 
are going to be deployed and the duties of the United Nations or African Union regarding 
the payment of salaries and allowances to the peacekeepers. In the case of AMIS the 
SAPS contributed one hundred and twenty five (125) peacekeepers and are under the 
command and control of the Special Representative of the Chair of the Commission 
(SRCC) of the African Union, Baba Ghana Kingibe. The duties of the African Union are 
to provide them with shelter, food, daily allowance and logistical support like vehicles, 
information technological support and to offer them protection while on duty. Be it as it 
may, the African Union had its challenges in achieving these duties. Peacekeepers would 
sometimes work for months without being paid and this dropped their morale given that 
they were performing their functions in the harshest mission in the world.     
 
4.3.7. Rules of Engagement  (ROE)  
According to Cilliers in Cilliers et al (1995:75), Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide 
political direction, within legal parameters, and guidance to commanders at all levels 
governing the use of force. They provide guidelines and conditions in which force should 
be used in the peacekeeping operations. Some of the instances under which force can be 
used are in self-defence or defence against direct attack or threats to the lives of members 
of the peace support operation. Force can be used in resisting attempts to disarm peace 
support forces and also in resisting attempts to arrest or abduct peace support forces. 
Furthermore force can be used to resist the attempts by forceful means to prevent peace 
support forces from discharging their mandated duties.  
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Rules of engagement further prescribe specific weapon systems that the mission should 
use and the conditions under which these weapons should be used. Under any 
circumstances, if force has to be used it should be preceded by a clear warning.  
However use of force must not be delayed if there is immediate threat to lives, if 
casualties have already occurred or a warning will increase the risk of death or injury. If 
force has to be used, it has to be minimum use of force to achieve the aim of using it. 
Furthermore collateral damage to civilians’ property should be calculated and the use of 
such force should cease as soon as circumstances permit. Rules of Engagement are very 
strict and peacekeepers must adhere to them to avoid unnecessary use of force with 
possibilities of injuries, deaths or damage to properties of innocent people.       
 
4.3.8. Other elements of the legal framework 
The legal framework for a peacekeeping operation will not be complete if it does not 
include international human rights law and humanitarian law. According to de Rover 
(1998:60) human rights and humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) form an integral 
part of international law with both types of law designed to protect individuals and 
collectives and their fundamental rights and freedoms. Human rights are covered in the 
International Bill of Human Rights, which include the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On the other hand de Rover 
(1998:61) states that humanitarian law provides the applicable standards for protection of 
victims of war and the conduct of hostilities. Human rights law and humanitarian law are 
the basis for peacekeeping missions. According to Bah in Aboagye and Bah (2005:40) 
Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that “no government has the right to hide behind 
national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its 
people”. Human rights and humanitarian law or law of armed conflict are the most 
frequently used international instruments that are intended to protect breaches of human 
rights and also to protect the civilians during the war. The code of conduct for the 
peacekeepers is also an element of the legal framework.  Peacekeepers are bound to act 
within the ambit of the code of conduct to maintain the integrity and professionalism of 
the blue helmets and the African Union peacekeepers.  
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Any infringement of the code of conduct can have dire consequences to the peacekeepers 
with a possibility of being repatriated back to their countries. National legislation of the 
troop or police contributing country also forms part of the legal framework.  
In the case of South African Police Service members in Darfur, any SAPS member who 
commits an act that is an offence under the South African legislation should be arrested 
and made to appear in front of a South African court to answer for such an offence. This 
is also the case with peacekeepers that contravene the local legislation of the host 
country.   
 
4.4.   HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
 
According to Rankhumise (2006:6), as in many conflict scenarios, women, children, the 
disabled, and the elderly have invariably been among the victims of the military 
confrontations between the Government of Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement 
and the Sudanese Liberation Army. The warring factions seriously affected the socio-
economic fabric of society during the destruction of villages and the looting of property 
and livestock during raids. Common to this type of scenario, people flee their homes and 
become displaced. Some even flee their countries of abode to other neighbouring 
countries to be refugees. The Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) report indicates that since 
early 2003, the people of Darfur have endured a vicious campaign of violence, which has 
forced almost 2 million people to flee from their destroyed villages in search of safety. 
Rape against women and children has been a constant factor in this violence throughout 
this campaign terror. More tragically it continues to this day even long after people fled 
from their villages. The stories of rape survivors give a horrific illustration of the daily 
reality of people in Darfur and especially of women and young girls, the primary victims 
of this form of violence (Rankhumise 2006:6).  
 
The deplorable impact of complex emergencies within Africa is underscored in the 
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees’ state of the world’s displaced and other 
populations as depicted in Aboagye (2007:2) in the following table 3:      
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Table 3: Total population of concern to UNHCR by region of asylum and category  
(1 January 2005) 
 
Others of concern  Total 
population 
of concern 
Region Refugees Asylum 
seekers 
Returned 
refugees  
IDPs of 
concern to 
UNHCR  
Returned 
IDPs  
Stateless Others  
Africa 3 023 000 207 000 330 000 1 200 000 33 000 120 67 000 4 860 120 
Asia 3 471 000 56 000 1 146 000 1 328 000 62 000 724 000 113 000 6 900 000 
Europe 2 068 000 270 000 19 000 900 000 51 000 731 000 391 000 4 430 000 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean  
36 000 8 000 90 2 000 000 -  26 000 2 070 090  
Northern 
America 
562 000 291 000 - - - 140 - 853 000 
Oceania 76 000 6 000 - - - - - 82 140  
Total 9 236 000 838 000 1 495 090 5 428 000 146 000 1 455 260 597 000 19 195 350  
         
 
The devastation that is left by most of the conflicts cannot be overlooked. The table 
above indicates gruesome statistics of people who were affected by the conflicts through 
the world by January 2005. These numbers are huge and imply that people are constantly 
on the move searching for safety, security and a place where they can be housed and live 
peacefully.    
 
4.5.  DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION 
(DDR). 
 
The devastating conflicts that catch international attention such as Sudan, Somalia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Cotê d’Ivore and others were and are still fueled 
by easy access to small arms and assault rifles within the conflict environment.  Opposing 
parties will ensure that they arm themselves to protect their interests in times of attacks 
by their rivals. The skirmishes that take place during the climax of each conflict leave 
carnage and loss of lives. De-escalation of conflict occurs when parties agree to settle 
their differences. The signing of peace agreements and voluntary surrendering of arms by 
the parties typically characterizes this time.  
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This is the time when the peacekeeping mission, together with other role players prepares 
the environment in which the DDR process is going to take place. Most of the 
components play a critical role in this costly and delicate process. The three phases of 
DDR are interconnected and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the 
success of the others (Fusato, 2003:1). The goals of DDR are both short and long term. In 
the short term, DDR aims to restore security and stability through the disarmament of 
warring parties. On the other hand, demobilization of armed groups is another 
fundamental step in the improvement of security conditions at the end of the conflict.   
The long term goal of DDR is to establish a sustained social and economic reintegration 
of ex-combatants into a peaceful society.  
 
4.5.1. Disarmament 
Disarmament entails the actual handing over of the firearms and other elements of the 
artillery or arsenals of all parties to the conflict with the purpose of creating a weapon 
free and peaceful environment. The activities that take place during disarmament include, 
amongst others, pointing out and de-mining of areas where mines have being buried, 
destruction of weapons, management of weapon collection sites and also registration of 
soldiers and their weapons. Potential target groups for the DDR process are usually 
government forces, opposition forces, irregular armed groups, armed civilians, militias 
and other foreign forces that might have been in the conflict area.  
 
The main reason for disarmament is to restore order and to give the authority and power 
to the state to protect its own citizens. It also reduces a chance of relapse into armed 
conflict due to reduction or complete disarmament of the civilians and other armed 
groups in the mission environment. Various methods are used to destroy firearms. These 
include burning them, and cutting or shredding them. It is the duty of the experts from the 
military to utilize the most effective and efficient method of destruction in this regard.   
In the Darfur situation, disarmament is not ready to be suggested because the AMIS did 
not prove itself as having the capability of protecting the civilians in Darfur especially 
under the previous Chapter VII mandate. Furthermore the Sudanese authorities on the 
other hand did not show any intentions of protecting the civilians in Darfur.  
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There is therefore still no trust among the parties to the conflict, and armed groups will 
not voluntarily hand over their firearms because they believe that they need them to 
protect themselves against their enemies. There is a very substantial role for the mission 
during the disarmament process because it has the responsibility of establishing the DDR 
center that has the entire basic infrastructure for both management of the process and 
temporary residence for the ex-combatants. The cost implications for this process are 
very high and it needs to be conducted by experts to ensure that it does not fail. It is 
obvious that the peace process can fail for reasons that are independent of whatever part 
of the DDR programs. However the failed or misused DDR processes not only threaten 
the success of the peace process, they also risk aggravating the conflict should a relapse 
occur (Sundh and Schjørlein 2006:13).           
 
4.5.2. Demobilization 
Demobilization is a process of either downsizing, or completely disbanding potential 
targets of disarmament as mentioned above. According to Aboagye and Kent (2005:97), 
demobilization involves the assembling, quartering, administration and discharge of 
former combatants who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to 
encourage their transition to civilian life. The demobilization process takes place in a 
secured camp where various activities can be carried out to ensure smooth transition and 
re-insertion of the ex-combatants into normal community life. The camps should have the 
capacity for assessing vocational skills, interpersonal relations and provide referrals to 
employment and social services if needed (Aboagye et al 2005:98). Some of the activities 
that should carried out in the demobilization camps include, amongst others, the 
following: 
 Sports and recreation 
 Literacy training  
 Skills training  
 Health education  
 Peace accord orientation  
 Vocational counseling and  
 Pre-discharge orientation  
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It is the duty of all the components of the peace support operation to ensure that all areas 
that need to be attended by various expertises are covered. Thus the focus of the 
humanitarian organizations will be on the welfare of the ex-combatants and their families 
and the police and military will focus on safety and security related aspects whereas the 
political component of the peace support orientation will focus on the processes of the 
peace accord and the peace process.                 
 
4.5.3. Reintegration  
The reintegration process entails measures provided to the former combatants with the 
intention to increase the potential for them and their families' economic and social means 
to survive after being reinserted into normal civilian life (Aboagye et al 2005:98). The 
reintegration programs can include various forms of assistance to the former combatants. 
Former combatants are given various types of assistance that are either financial, material 
assistance, or assistance in kind. Assistance might also be in a form of skills training or 
entitlements that can assist the former combatants to start a sustainable life after the 
conflict.        
 
4.6.  SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PEACEKEEPERS 
 
Peacekeeping is a function that is not similar to the normal functions that are performed 
by the police and military while they are in their countries of origin. It entails performing 
a new function, out of the normal national environment and also being expected to 
perform that function with other peacekeepers from various parts of the world and 
together working in a new environment that is characterized by conflict. Therefore 
peacekeepers need to be properly selected and capacitated for the new function and new 
challenges that they are going to face in the peace support operation.  The kind of training 
conducted should be able to prepare the peacekeepers to cope with the realities of some 
of the harshest conditions in the world. According to Fetherston (1994: 164) the crucial 
significance of training in the process of developing effective peacekeeping is two-fold:  
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First training provides the means for dissemination of the meta-goals guiding peaceful 
intervention and implementation of third party activities designed to accomplish those 
goals, and secondly, training provides an important link in the testing of the conceptual 
base of peacekeeping. Selection of and training of peacekeepers is a critical task that 
should be carried out with great circumspection. Selection includes recruiting volunteers 
and putting them through series of medical tests that include a mandatory Human 
Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV) test. The other tests that are recommended by 
peacekeeping countries like the Republic of South Africa are cholesterol testing, blood 
alcohol volume testing and psychometric tests. It is a prerequisite that all peacekeepers to 
be deployed have to be in possession of valid drivers’ licenses, they must be able to drive 
a 4x4 type of vehicle under difficult conditions. They must be able to pass their English 
test and should be able to shoot with their pistols.  
 
After passing these initial tests, the incumbent peacekeeper is recommended to attend 
training on peacekeeping. According to Aboagye et al (2005:50) the United Nations 
recommends three types of training in the process of deploying peacekeepers to peace 
support operations. The first is a generic peacekeeping course that is presented to the 
incumbent peacekeepers that have passed their medical and psychometric tests as part of 
their selection process. This generic course lasts for two weeks and its purpose is to 
introduce peacekeeping concepts to the participants and to ensure that they have the 
necessary skills and theoretical knowledge and also the practical requirements of going 
on the mission.  
 
The United Nations’ Selection and Training Team carry out quality control on all the 
peacekeepers that are deployed to its missions to ensure that they comply with all the 
criteria and standards set for peacekeeping deployments. If a participant fails the 
selection criteria he or she will be repatriated to his or her country at the expense of that 
country. The second type of training is three days pre-mission training. The purpose of 
this training is to give the participants a clear background of the conflict and to discuss 
mission specific information.  
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The last type of training is the induction training that participants receive upon arrival in 
the mission. Its purpose is to orientate the peacekeepers and to do assessments of their 
driving skills, language skills and shooting skills. Training assists peacekeepers to have a 
mental picture of what is going to happen upon arrival in the peace support operation.  
 
4.7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Peacekeeping has evolved dramatically since the deployment of the first missions in 
1948.  Most of the developments were influenced by the lessons that were learned by the 
United Nations and the regions that were involved in peacekeeping missions. It is clear 
that traditional peacekeeping had to change due to the challenges that were brought by 
the end of the cold war. Multidimensional peacekeeping and new peace support 
operations were more complex and included role players who were not in the 
peacekeeping arena before the end of the cold war. The recommendations from the 
Brahimi report also added momentum towards continuation of an evolutionary process of 
United Nations peace support operations. Humanitarian assistance and the DDR process 
play a significant role in making a difference between conflict and peace. Strict selection 
and rigorous training assists in improving the standards of peacekeeping operations that 
make a difference to those that receive the services of the peacekeepers. The next chapter 
will focus on the South African Police Service officers in both the AMIS mission, and the 
current UNAMID mission in Darfur: Sudan.      
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE DEPLOYMENT IN DARFUR   
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The birth of new democracy in the Republic of South Africa in 1994 after long years of 
apartheid rule came with reacceptance of the country into the global political arena. 
During the long years of oppressive government, high levels of violence that were caused 
by racial conflicts and demonstrations against the government characterized the country 
in this regard. Due to the political change in the country, South Africa had to fulfill its 
obligations of being in the international political environment. According to Bradshaw 
(2007:10) South Africa has a troubled history of deep-rooted social conflict. Upon its re-
entry into the full international community, the country had, in addition to its internal 
crime combating challenges,   to ensure that it met its commitments in respect of peace 
operations. However South Africa preferred to deploy its peacekeepers to the peace 
support operations in the African continent due to the serious lack of support for these 
operations. Guided by the White Paper on Peacekeeping operations of 1999 (currently 
under review), South Africa deployed its peacekeepers to various missions in the African 
continent. Amongst these peacekeepers are the members of the South African Police 
Service who were deployed for the first time in March 2005 as a team of police officers 
to the African Union Mission in Sudan. The following discussion is going to focus on the 
process that is followed by the South African Police Service in deploying its members to 
African Union Mission in Sudan. The process includes selection, training, deployment, 
in-mission support and return of peacekeepers to their respective stations.      
 
5.2. SELECTION AND TRAINING  
 
Selection and training are done with members who volunteered and agreed to be 
deployed. Members submitted names at their respective stations and were called by their 
provincial offices to undergo various medical tests that are carried out by practitioners 
from 1 Military Hospital in Thaba-Tshwana, Pretoria.  
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The tests that were conducted are similar to those of the South African National Defense 
Force members who are deployed to various peacekeeping missions. The tests included 
HIV testing, cholesterol, nicotine and alcohol presence in the blood. The South African 
Police Service Psychological Services and Social Work Service would conduct 
psychometric tests and family visits respectively. Family visits are carried out, the aim of 
which is to assess whether the member’s family circumstances can cope with the 
challenges while he / she is away on to the mission for six months. Social Work Services 
would then provide recommendations on whether the member should be deployed or not. 
After such tests and visits are completed, the member is called to attend training for two 
weeks in Pretoria.  
 
The training intervention that they undergo was developed as a regional course under the 
Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) that is 
an organization of thirteen (13) southern African police agencies in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The course was developed from the combination of 
Standard Generic Training Manuals (SGTM) of the United Nations, and the background, 
role and activities of the African Union in general, and the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) in particular. The training covered the following modules: 
 
Table 4.  SAPS peacekeeping training modules.  
 
 MODULES  FOCUS  
1 Background to the United Nations and African 
peacekeeping. 
 UN peacekeeping history. 
 Structure of Peacekeeping Operations 
(PKO) 
 Legal framework 
 The African Union (AU) system  
2 United Nations Police   UN Police Division  
 UN police and AU current deployments  
 UN Police selection and training criteria 
 Roles of the peacekeepers. 
 UN reporting system  
 Best practices in peacekeeping.   
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3 The United Nations Peacekeeper. 
 
 UN and SARPCCO police codes of 
conduct 
 Cultural awareness  
 Stress management  
 Gender issues and peacekeeping 
4 United Nations issues  
 
 Negotiation and mediation  
 DDR 
 Media relations 
 Humanitarian assistance  
 Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) 
5 Safety awareness  
 
 Personal safety  
 Mine awareness  
 Health precautions and HIV AIDS 
 Basic life support  
 UN vehicle operations 
 Terrorism  
 
6 Human Rights and law enforcement  
 
 Introduction to human rights  
 Code of conduct for law enforcement 
officials  
 Arrest, detention and imprisonment  
 Vulnerable groups  
 Use of force and firearms  
 Criminal investigations and victims rights  
7 United Nations Police operating techniques 
 
 Radio communication 
 Report writing  
 Map reading  
8 Practical field exercise  
 
 Practical application on all theoretical 
aspects of the course.    
 
The peacekeeping course as outlined in table 3 also includes practical aspects that are 
completed outside the ambit of the theoretical presentations (models 1 to 7) that are 
indicated above. Additional practical aspects include, for instance shooting exercises, 
light physical training, 4 x 4 lecture and practical driving exercises in difficult terrain and 
report writing. This training was authorized and appreciated by the United Nations for 
positive regional initiatives by the regional organization (SARPCCO).   
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After the training members go back to their respective stations to be called again later to 
attend the pre-mission induction training for three days and are deployed immediately 
thereafter. The pre-mission training focuses on mission specific information that has been 
presented during the course where SAPS members who have returned from the mission 
brief their colleagues on what to expect upon arrival in the mission. It is also during the 
induction training that SAPS incumbent peacekeepers get inoculated and receive their 
logistical packages they will use in the mission.                  
 
5.3. SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE MEMBERS IN 
DARFUR  
 
After the recruitment, selection and training that took place in South Africa and after an 
8-hour flight to Darfur, the SAPS peacekeepers start to see the reality of peacekeeping. 
Upon arrival they start with induction training for the first seven days in El Fashir, AMIS 
Head Quarters. The initial deployment strength of the SAPS was eighteen in March 2005 
but the number has been increased to one hundred and twenty-six (126) to date. The first 
challenge that the SAPS members face is accommodation. From their comfortable homes 
in South African they have to face a period of six months in tents. Harsh desert climatic 
conditions with temperatures that range between forty-five (45) and fifty (50) degrees 
Celsius during a good summer day dropping to minus five (5) at night, tends to be a 
nightmare to the SAPS members. Different smells and food tend to force these 
peacekeepers to remember their staple food in South Africa. Interaction with various 
cultural settings of the local people, local police, military and the international civilians 
and humanitarian agencies workers is another challenge to the SAPS peacekeepers. They 
have to acclimatize to all these new environments. During the first month of deployment 
some of them get mild malaria and lie in military hospital for a while.        
 
5.3.1. Concept of operation (CONOP) 
 
According to the Concept of Operation (CONOP) issued by the African Union in 2004, 
Darfur was divided in the following eight sectors: 
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 Sector 1:  El Fashir also Head Quarters of the mission 
 Sector 2: Nyala 
 Sector 3: Junaynah 
 Sector 4: Kabkabiya 
 Sector 5: Tine 
 Sector 6: Kutum 
 Sector 7: Zalingei 
 Sector 8: Al Daein 
 
In addition to the SAPS members in the mission, there were another twenty-nine 
peacekeeping police agencies in the mission who were working together with the SAPS 
members. Other role players who worked in close proximity with the peacekeepers were 
representatives of the parties to the conflict, i.e. Sudanese Liberation Movement 
(SLM/A), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Government of Sudan police 
and army. According to AMIS Force Head Quarters Daily Situation report No. 060/06 of 
1st March 2006 the police strength was one thousand two hundred and twenty two (1 222) 
police peacekeepers in Darfur. The number increased to one thousand three hundred and 
thirty- nine (1 339) at the beginning of 2007. AMIS was a Chapter VI mission. This 
implied that the SAPS members were unarmed and faced with the danger of being 
threatened or killed at the whim of the marauding rebels. The functions of the 
peacekeepers were only limited to observing, monitoring, advising and reporting on any 
activities that were contrary to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  
       
4.3.2. Logistical and financial support of AMIS 
Logistical support of the mission plays a critical role in assisting the mission to realize its 
goals. The AMIS was faced with serious logistical challenges that frustrated most of the 
peacekeepers. The mission had twenty (20) MI-8 helicopters that were donated by the 
Canadian and the Netherlands governments. These helicopters were utilized for 
transportation between the sectors and to Khartoum. However due to a lack of proper 
logistical planning, most of these helicopters have been grounded due to a lack of fuel 
and servicing. Radio communications were also a serious challenge and the only means 
of communication was through the Thuraya satellite cell phones.  
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This mode of communication was expensive but had to be paid for due to the necessity of 
communication in Darfur. AMIS had a total strength of six hundred and forty-seven (647) 
vehicles that were used in the mission, of which the AU purchased five hundred and two. 
Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE), a multinational corporation that comes from the 
United States of America, provided accommodation and contracted Medical Support 
Solutions for AMIS. Vega aviation was a contracted fixed wing air service that was used 
but tended to cut their services due to lack of funds from the AMIS.  
 
It is against this background on logistical and financial support that it became clear that 
most of the services rendered by AMIS to the peacekeepers were largely donations and 
contributions from other countries. It was not difficult to conclude that the mission was 
going to struggle to meet its objectives. This was a further frustrating factor to most of 
the SAPS peacekeepers who knew that they could not do anything to save the situation 
except to accept that they were part of the mission, and that they would assist where they 
could assist. Sometimes peacekeepers would go for a period of three to four months 
without receiving their Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). This was frustrating 
because peacekeepers needed money to sustain themselves in their harsh six months stay 
in Darfur.  
 
5.3.3. Command and control of AMIS 
The Mission was under the control of AMIS and authorized by the Chairperson of the 
AU Commission, His Excellency Alpha Oumar Konare. The Head of the mission, on the 
other hand was Baba Ghana Kingibe and the police commissioner was a senior officer 
from the South African Police Service, Director Tsiloane. All the sectors in Darfur 
reported to the mission headquarters in El Fashir. A further division existed at sector 
level where sectors were further divided into team sides and police stations. Given this 
long chain of command and lack of effective communication, critical information took 
some time before it reached it destination.  
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5.3.4. Support from the South African Police service       
Support from home was not as easy to render as some SAPS peacekeepers expected. The 
promises made by Social Work Services sometimes could not materialize due to various 
reasons. A delegation would leave South Africa aiming to visit all the SAPS 
peacekeepers but would hardly visit two sectors due to the lack of helicopters to take 
them through. Another challenge was that the social workers were also shocked when 
they realized what the situation in the mission was and this created further fears for the 
incumbent peacekeepers with whom they met. Logistical support was also a serious 
challenge due to the banning of the South African National Defense Force’s bigger 
aircraft from landing in El Fashir. This exacerbated the challenges even more because 
families were used to sending some items to their loved ones via the SANDF flights. The 
only time when the peacekeepers could get a chance to see their families was during their 
fourteen days Compensatory Time Off (CTO). However sometimes they would wait for 
air transport to lift them from the sector to El Fashir for two to three days of their CTO.          
 
While in the mission, peacekeepers are confronted with stressful conditions that include, 
amongst others, humanitarian challenges that they do not have any powers to stop, 
serious crimes like murder, rape, robberies and also attacks that are aimed at them as 
peacekeepers. The Haskanita killings that took the lives of eleven (11) peacekeepers bear 
testimony to the reality that unarmed peacekeepers are sometimes killed in Darfur. This 
unfortunate incident took place on the 29th of September 2007 at a place called Haskanita 
that was relatively peaceful and stable. A convoy of AMIS peacekeepers that was on 
patrol was ambushed by a group of disgruntled militia who wanted to be recognized as 
one of the bigger parties to the conflict. The casualties were from various countries that 
include Senegal, Egypt, Rwanda, Nigeria and Botswana. Considering that these incidents 
take place in front of peacekeepers that might not have been paid for a period of three 
months, it was not amazing to hear that some of the peacekeepers returned to their 
countries sighting various reasons.  
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5.4. RETURN OF PEACEKEEPERS TO SAPS 
 
After the gruesome period of facing one’s death on a daily basis, the SAPS peacekeepers 
come back to South Africa with high expectations that they will be used in better posts 
like training other peacekeepers due to lack of capacity in that field or in other fields 
where members have learned that they can improve and have an impact on the local 
crime situation. Unfortunately the SAPS do not use these expectations and experiences.  
The qualified peacekeepers with mission experience tend to become frustrated once back 
at their original posts and some even think of getting back to the mission to earn more 
money rather than to be continually  frustrated by the non-supportive working 
environment. In addition to this lack of recognition of their skills and the experiences, the 
SAPS indicate that peacekeepers should not be redeployed immediately after a mission. 
The rule is that such a member should stay for a period of two years before being 
deployed again. Another worrying factor is that peacekeepers are not properly 
reintegrated with their families. During the recruitment and selection process, the SAPS 
goes to great lengths in testing its members through expensive tests but when they come 
back from the mission the perception is that they are no longer cared for by the 
organization because the peacekeepers have accomplished what was originally intended 
for them. At the end of 2007 it was clear that UNAMID, under the command of a South 
African Police Service Assistant Commissioner Mike Fryer, was going to take over the 
command of AMIS under UN authority with a revised mandate and better logistical 
support.                
 
5.5. CONCLUSION  
 
The South African Police Service peacekeepers go through a rigorous process of 
recruitment and training before they are deployed to AMIS. Their medical and 
psychometric testing ensures that the SAPS deploy peacekeepers that will cope with the 
challenges of the mission. SAPS peacekeepers are faced with harsh climatic challenges 
and unforgiving working conditions when compared to those at home.  
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Inadequate logistical and financial support by AMIS created serious morale challenges 
but peacekeepers had to do their work for the welfare of the people of Darfur. Lack of 
recognition after returning from the mission created frustration in most of the SAPS 
peacekeepers that needed to make a difference after they arrived home. This created a 
perception that their experiences and new expertise were of no value because they were 
not incorporated into the bigger picture of the SAPS as an organization. The next chapter 
is going to focus on the presentation of our data, and its interpretation with a view of 
giving a proper perspective on the analysis and results of the study. This will be done 
through the presentation of data tables of variables derived from the questionnaire used in 
this research.      
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CHAPTER 6. 
 
DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter aims to present the data collected through frequency tables with various 
variables from the research questionnaire. The major limitation of this research is that 
only the SAPS peacekeepers that were in the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan, 
were used as the subjects of this research. Their results might not be as good as those who 
had finished their operation, and were waiting to be redeployed. Forty-two (42) 
questionnaires were distributed amongst all the members of the SAPS who were 
completing their mission and all the questionnaires were returned without any one being 
spoiled or missing.  
 
6.2.  DATA PRESENTATION TABLES AND INTEPRETATION  
 
Table 5. 
Gender 
Category  Count Percent 
Male  29 69.0476 
Female 13 30.9523 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 69.0% were male and 30.95% were female. 
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Table 6  
Race  
Category  Count Percent 
African 24 57.1428 
White 11 26.1904 
Coloured 5 11.9047 
Asian  1 2.3809 
Missing 1 2.3809 
 
Of all the respondents 57.14% were African, 26.19% were White, 11.90% were Coloured 
and 2.38% were Asian     
 
Table 7 
Age  
Category  Count Percent 
Younger than 25  0 0.0000 
25 to 35  13 30.9523 
35 to 45  23 54.7619 
45 to 50  5 11.9047 
50 to 60  1 2.3809 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 30.95% were between the age of 25 to 35 years, 54.76 were 
between the age of 35 and 45 years, 11.90% were between 45 and 50 years whereas 
2.38% were above 50 years.     
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Table 8  
Rank   
Category  Count Percent 
Constable 4 9.5238 
Sergeant  7 16.6666 
Inspector 25 59.5238 
Captain 6 14.2857 
Superintendent 0 0.0000 
Senior Superintendent 0 0.0000 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
From the table 9.5% of the respondents were Constables, 16.66 % were Sergeants,  
59.52% were Inspectors and 14.28% were Captains.   
 
Table 9  
Years of service   
Category  Count Percent 
0 to 5 years  4 9.5238 
5 to 10  4 9.5238 
10 to 15  13 30.9523 
15 to 20  12 28.5714 
20 years and more  9 21.4285 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 9.52% were having 0 to 5 years of service, another 9.52% was 
between 5 and 10 years of service, 30.95% had between 10 and 15 years of service, 
28.57% had between 15 and 20 years of service and 21.42% had more than 20 years of 
service.   
 
 
 
 53 
Table 10 
Educational qualification  
Category  Count Percent 
Below Grade 12  4 9.5238 
Grade 12  24 57.1428 
Degree / Diploma  12 28.5714  
Honours / B-Tech  2 4.7619 
Masters degree and more  0 0.0000 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 9.52 had qualifications below Grade 12, 57.14% had Grade 12, 
28.57% had Diplomas and 4.76% had Honours degrees or B / Tech Degrees.  
 
Table 11 
Voluntary deployment to AMIS 
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  42 100.000 
No  0 0.000 
Missing 0 0.000 
 
All the respondents volunteered to be deployed.  
 
Table 12 
Voluntary medical tests before deployment  
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  41 97.6190 
No  1 2.3809 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents have undergone voluntary medical testing before 
deployment.  
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Table 13  
Clarity of the course on the functioning of the UN and the AU 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  28 66.6666 
Somewhat 12 28.5714 
A little  1 2.3809 
Not at all  1 2.3809 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that the course was clear on the functioning of 
the AU and the UN. 
 
Table 14  
Clarity of the course in dealing with human rights issues in the mission 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  28 66.6666 
Somewhat 11 26.1904 
A little  2 4.7619 
Not at all  1 2.3809 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents indicate that the course was clear on human rights issues.  
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Table 15  
4 x 4 skills development during the Generic Peacekeeping Course 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  26 61.9047 
Somewhat 10 23.8095 
A little  2 4.7619 
Not at all  4 9.5238 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that the course developed their 4 x 4 driving 
skills. 
 
Table 16  
Clarity of lectures in dealing with vulnerable groups in the mission 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  27 64.2857 
Somewhat 11 26.1904 
A little  2 4.7619 
Not at all  2 4.7619 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that the lectures were clear.  
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Table 17  
Treatment of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) by the Sudanese police.   
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  2 4.7619 
Somewhat 11 26.1904 
A little  13 30.9523 
Not at all  16 38.0952 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 4.76% indicate that the refugees and IDPs were treated fairly by 
the Sudanese police, 26.19 indicate that they were treated somewhat fairly, 30.95% 
indicate that they were treated a little unfair and 38.09 % indicated that they were not 
treated fairly at all. 
 
Table 18  
The extent of the observation of practices by the Sudanese police 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  4 9.5238 
Somewhat 19 45.2380 
A little  15 35.7142 
Not at all  4 9.5238 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 9.52% were able to observe the practices of the Sudanese police to 
a larger extent, 45.23% were reasonably able to observe the Sudanese police, 35.71% 
were able to observe the Sudanese police to a small extent and the 9.52% were unable to 
observe the Sudanese police.    
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Table 19 
The extent of monitoring the activities of the Sudanese police 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  7 16.6666 
Somewhat 15 35.7142 
A little  14 33.3333 
Not at all  6 14.2857 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 16.66% were able to monitor the activities of the Sudanese police 
to a great deal, 35.71% could reasonably monitor the activities of the Sudanese police, 
33.33% could monitor the activities of the Sudanese police to a little extent and 14.28% 
could not monitor the Sudanese police at all.      
 
Table 20  
The extent of advising the Sudanese police 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  5 11.9047 
Somewhat 13 30.9523 
A little  14 33.3333 
Not at all  10 23.8095 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 11.90% were able to advise the Sudanese police to a great deal, 
30.95% to a reasonable extent, 33.33% a little extent and 23.80% were unable to advise 
the Sudanese police.    
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Table 21  
The extent of reporting misconducts, criminal activities or good practices of the Sudanese 
police. 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  1 2.3809 
Somewhat 11 26.1904 
A little  9 21.4285 
Not at all  19 45.2380 
Missing 2 4.7619 
 
Of all the respondents only 2.38 % indicated a great deal of reporting misconducts, 
criminal activities or good practices of the Sudanese police, 26.19% found reporting 
somewhat reasonable, 21.42% found reporting a little difficult and 45.23 found reporting 
of such incidents totally difficult.     
 
 Table 22  
The logistical support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in 
Darfur. 
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  24 57.1428 
No  18 42.8571 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all the respondents 57.14% indicated to have received logistical support from the 
SAPS and 42.85% indicated the contrary.   
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Table 23 
The social support from the South African Police Service while in the mission in Darfur. 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  10 23.8095 
Somewhat 5 11.9047 
A little  6 14.2857 
Not at all  20 47.6190 
Missing 1 2.3809 
 
Of all the respondents 23.80% indicated that they received social support from the SAPS, 
11.90% indicated that the support was somewhat reasonable, 14.28% indicated that social 
support was only a little and 47.61% indicated that they had never received any social 
support from the SAPS.    
 
 Table 24  
A level of preparedness from South Africa on peacekeeping functions performed in 
Darfur.  
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  28 66.6666 
Somewhat 7 16.6666 
A little  6 14.2857 
Not at all  1 2.3809 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
The majority of the SAPS peacekeepers indicated that they were highly prepared for their 
functions in Darfur.   
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Table 25 
An assessment during the Generic Peacekeeping course before deployment.   
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  34 80.9523 
No  8 19.0476 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that they were assessed during the Generic 
Peacekeeping course before they were deployed.   
 
Table 26  
Medical testing before or after deployment. 
Category  Count Percent 
Before  41 97.6190 
After  0 0.0000 
Missing 1 2.3809 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that they had medical testing before they were 
deployed.  
 
Table 27 
Awareness on South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping deployments. 
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  28 66.6666 
No  13 30.9523 
Missing 1 2.3809 
 
A majority of the respondents indicated that they were aware of the SAPS policy on 
peacekeeping.  
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Table 28  
Waiting period before redeployment. 
Category  Count Percent 
1 Year 36 85.7142 
2 Years  1 2.3809 
3 Years  1 2.3809 
4 Years  0 0.0000 
5 Years 0 0.0000 
Missing  4 9.5238 
 
Majority of the respondents indicated that the waiting period before redeployment is 
1year. 
 
Table 29  
An awareness on senior management’s attendance of any peacekeeping training in South 
Africa or elsewhere. 
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  15 35.7142 
No 26 61.9047 
Missing  1 2.3809 
 
Of all the respondents 35.71% indicated that they are aware of senior managers who 
attended peacekeeping training and 61.90% indicated that they were not aware of any 
attendance of senior managers.   
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Table 30  
The willingness to share peacekeeping experiences and managerial support in 
implementing such experiences. 
 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  20 47.6190 
Somewhat 14 33.3333 
A little  6 14.2857 
Not at all  2 4.7619 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Of all respondents 47.61% indicated that they were willing to share and implement their 
peacekeeping experiences, 33.33% indicated reasonable willingness, 14.28% a little 
willingness and only 4.76% indicated unwillingness in sharing their experiences and in 
implementing them.     
 
Table 31  
The willingness to be redeployed if given another chance. 
Category  Count Percent 
Yes  34 80.9523 
No  8 19.0476 
Missing 0 0.0000 
 
Majority of the respondents indicated that they were willing to be redeployed if they are 
given another chance.  
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Table 32  
Value of presence in Darfur on the lives of the victims of armed conflict. 
 
Category  Count Percent 
Great deal  25 59.5238 
Somewhat 11 26.1904 
A little  4 9.5238 
Not at all  1 2.3809 
Missing 1 2.3809 
  
Of all the respondents 59.52% indicated that their presence in Darfur added value to the 
lives of the victims of armed conflict 26.19% indicated somewhat reasonable value, 
9.52% indicated little value and only 2.38% indicated that it had no value at all.     
 
6.3. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter provided data and its interpretation. It indicated the limitations of data 
collection and the influence it might have on this study. The data indicates that the SAPS 
deployments to peacekeeping or peace support operations need improvement to ensure 
that they are abreast with the realities that are experienced by the peacekeepers in the 
mission. It is against this background that the next chapter will provide the 
recommendations that should be implemented to ensure that corrective steps are taken to 
improve SAPS peacekeeping deployments.     
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CHAPTER 7  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMEDATIONS 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The outcomes of data interpretation reveal a clear picture of a high level of commitment 
and willingness of the SAPS members to serve in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. 
The focus of the study was to provide a description of the processes that are followed by 
the SAPS in deploying its members to Darfur. The study had to identify shortcomings in 
the processes and provide recommendations on how to remedy such weaknesses. The aim 
of this chapter is to provide the reader with the findings of the research and how they 
relate with the hypothesis and the objectives of this study as identified at the beginning of 
the research. This chapter will also provide comprehensive recommendations to improve 
the processes followed by the SAPS in peacekeeping deployments. 
 
7.2. FINDINGS  
 
7.2.1. Findings relating to the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: From data analysis, it is very clear that this hypothesis is not valid. It is 
clear that from the beginning of recruitment and selection processes all 
SAPS members who participate in the process of deployment do that 
voluntarily including medical testing and attending the Generic 
Peacekeeping Course. Analyzed data indicated that 100% of the 
respondents were not compelled to participate in peacekeeping 
deployments whereas 97.61 volunteered to undergo medical tests.  
 
Hypothesis 2: This hypothesis is also not valid. From data analysis 66.66% of the 
respondents indicated that the course has assisted them in understanding 
the AU and the UN systems and also human rights issues.  
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Furthermore 61.90% indicated that they developed their skills in 4 x 4 
driving and 64.28% indicated that the lectures were helpful in dealing with 
women and children in the mission.  
 
Hypothesis  3: This hypothesis is valid. Neither the SAPS nor the AMIS had performance 
measurement tools to evaluate the performance of the SAPS members in 
the mission. The only formal assessment conducted to the members was 
during the training on Generic Peacekeeping Course where 80.95% of 
respondents indicated that they were assessed.  
 
Hypothesis 4: This hypothesis is valid. Of all the respondents 80.74% indicated that they 
had plans to implement what they had learned. However unwillingness of 
their offices to shift from their old ways of doing things frustrated them 
and created a perception of negativity causing these police officials who 
have been on the mission to remain silent in different matters of policing. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  This hypothesis is valid. Of all respondents 47.61% indicated that they 
were willing to share and implement their peacekeeping experiences, 
33.33% indicated reasonable willingness. However there is no 
management support to ensure that these experienced peacekeepers can be 
further developed and even posted in areas where they can use their new 
knowledge and skills.  
 
Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis is valid. The SAPS has started peacekeeping deployments 
in 2005 and so far only four (4) Directors and one (1) Assistant 
Commissioner have been trained in peacekeeping nationally. The 
limitation of knowledge and a good understanding of peacekeeping by 
SAPS senior managers is an outcome of the period that the SAPS has 
started working in this environment. Of the entire respondents 61.90% 
indicated that they are not aware of any senior manager who had 
undergone any training in peacekeeping.  
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7.2.2.  Findings relating to the objectives 
 
Objective 1. To determine whether the SAPS has internal policy guidelines on 
peacekeeping.  
 
This objective was achieved through the data that was presented in section 
5.2 above. Of all the respondents 66.66% have indicated that they are 
aware of the SAPS internal policy on peacekeeping. 
 
Objective 2. To determine whether the SAPS adequately trains its peacekeepers before 
they are deployed.            
 
   This objective was achieved. 66.66% of respondents indicated that they 
were adequately trained for the functions that they were performing in 
Darfur.  
 
Objective 3. To recommend measures that can be put in place to align recruitment, 
selection, training and deployment of members.  
 
 This objective is going to be achieved in the following discussion (7.3 
below) that is going to specifically focus on the potential 
recommendations that are suggested from this research.  
 
7.3.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to recommend possible measures that can be put in 
place to improve processes that the SAPS should follow in recruitment, selection, training 
and deployment of its members to avoid any deterioration of its internal arrangements.  
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7.3.1.  Peacekeeping capacity building in the SAPS        
Capacity building in the peacekeeping environment within the SAPS entails recruitment, 
selection, training and the opportunity to present courses by SAPS members with mission 
experience. This will lead to a sense of recognition and reward to those members who  
want to share their experiences with their fellow colleagues who will be going for 
deployment in Sudan or elsewhere. A training facility and permanent posts have to be 
created to ensure that this function is not done on ad hoc basis, using trainers from other  
institutions. Peacekeeping should have a specific training facility where peacekeeping 
courses can be presented. This can ease the frustration of peacekeeping trainers who are 
moving from one training facility to another after every course. A peacekeeping training 
facility can also assist in hosting peacekeeping course participants from other African 
countries in this regard.        
  
7.3.2.   Peacekeeping policy development   
The process of peacekeeping policy development, especially in a specialized function like 
peacekeeping, should involve inputs from members who have already got practical 
experience in this field. Several drafts of peacekeeping police guidelines have already 
been circulated within the SAPS and have not yet been finalized for implementation. To 
this end it is recommended that Division Visible Policing (Head Office) and Division 
Legal Services (Head Office) should work in consultation with the Provinces to request 
inputs, comments and suggestions on peacekeeping policy. Members from the 
peacekeeping mission should be given an opportunity to read the policy and provide 
comments on whether or not the policy is addressing all issues relevant to peacekeeping.  
 
7.3.3.  Attendance of seminars, conferences, exhibitions and courses in 
peacekeeping.   
Peacekeeping is a global phenomenon and most police officers in the world know their 
role in peacekeeping. Attendance of seminars and conferences does not only create 
opportunities for sharing information, but provides an in-depth knowledge base with the 
institution and that this will further assist in institutional capacity building.  
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Hosting of these of conferences and seminars will also provide an added benefit to the 
SAPS through interacting with a network of countries that already have experience and 
skills in the field of peacekeeping.  
 
7.3.4.  Partnerships with all role players in peacekeeping 
Sustainable partnerships should be created between the SAPS and various specialized 
role players like Non-Governmental Organizations, universities and other bodies that deal 
with peacekeeping. This can be advantageous to the SAPS because some of the NGO’s 
provide their services free of charge. These institutions can be used as a knowledge base 
for the SAPS, the SAPRCCO region and the African continent at large.  
 
7.4. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This research was conducted with the purpose of providing a description of the processes 
that the SAPS follows in its peacekeeping deployments. The scope of this research was 
very narrow because it focused much on the recruitment, selection, training and 
deployment of the SAPS members in Darfur. Further research can be conducted on issues 
like Security Sector Reform (SSR), peace-building interventions, vulnerable groups with 
in the peacekeeping environment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) during and after the conflict and the role of regional organizations in conflict 
prevention within the African context.  
 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter outlined the hypotheses and confirmed whether they were valid or not. The 
objectives of this study were also tested against the data provided by this study. As one of 
the objectives of the research, recommendations were also suggested and the opportunity 
for further research was also explored in this regard. This study has factually proved and 
disproved some of the perceptions that people had of SAPS peacekeeping deployment 
processes.  
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Furthermore, internal capacity building and external partnerships seemed to be at the core 
of SAPS sustainable capacity building in peacekeeping. Education, Training and 
Development (ETD) of the SAPS members in peacekeeping interventions will continue 
to be the bedrock of quality members that have been deployed since 2005.               
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ANNEXURE “A” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. Mark the answer you choose 
with an X. You do not have to write your name on the questionnaire. The researcher 
guarantees anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of the responses given in 
this regard. All the information gathered will be used to assist the South African 
Police Service to assess its contribution to peacekeeping in general.  
 
 Use black or blue ink if you are not filling the form electronically.  
 
Please leave the small boxes next to the right margin open for research purposes. 
 
E.g. 
 
Are you a member of the South African Police Service? 
 
Yes  Ω    1 No             2 
  
 
SECTION A   
 
A1. Gender  
 
Male        1 Female      2 
   
 
A2. Race 
 
African       1      White     2 Coloured    3 Asian              4 
 
 
A3. Age 
 
Younger than 25              1  
25 to 35                            2     
35 to 45                            3  
45 to 50                            4   
50 to 60                            5  
 
 
A4. Current rank  
 
Constable  
Sergeant   
Inspector  
Captain  
Superintendent  
Senior Superintendent  
 
 
 
 
 
A5. Number of years of service  
 
0 to 5 years                     1  
5 to 10                             2      
10 to 15                           3  
15 to 20                           4   
20 years and more           5                 
 
 
A6. Educational qualifications  
 
Below Grade 12                 1  
Grade 12                             2     
Degree / Diploma               3  
Honours / B-Tech               4   
Masters degree and more   5  
  
 
SECTION B  
 
B1. Did you volunteer to serve in the African Union Mission in Sudan: Darfur? 
  
Yes          1 No            2 
 
 
B2. Were you compelled to undergo any medical tests before leaving for the mission 
 in Sudan: Darfur. 
 
Yes        1 No            2 
 
  
B3. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in 
understanding the functioning of the African Union and the United Nations? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
B4. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in 
dealing with Human Rights issues in the mission? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B5. Did the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course you attended assist you in 
developing your 4 x 4 driving skills? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat    2 A little       3 Not at all      4 
  
 
B6. Were the lectures on vulnerable groups helpful in dealing with women and 
children in the mission? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat    2 A little       3 Not at all      4 
 
 
B7. Were the refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons treated fairly with due 
regard to their human rights by the local Sudanese Police?  
 
Great deal   1 Somewhat    2 A little          3 Not at all     4 
 
 
B8. To what extent were you able to observe the practices of the local Sudanese 
Police? 
 
Great deal   1 Somewhat    2 A little       3 Not at all        4 
 
 
B9. To what extent were you able to monitor the activities of the local Sudanese 
Police? 
 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
B10. To what extent were you able to advice the local Sudanese Police on policing 
issues? 
 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
B11. To what extent were you able to report any misconduct, criminal activity or good 
practices by the local Sudanese Police? 
 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B12. Did you get any logistical support from the South African Police Service while 
you were in Sudan: Darfur? 
 
Yes          1 No           2 
   
 
B13. Did you get any social support from the South African Police Service while in the 
Sudan: Darfur? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
B14. Was the two weeks Generic Peacekeeping Course and the Pre-mission briefing 
adequate enough to prepare you for your functions in the Sudan: Darfur? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
B15. Were you formally assessed on the course contents during the Generic 
Peacekeeping course? 
 
Yes          1 No             2 
 
 
B16. Did you undergo medical tests before or after the Generic Peacekeeping Course? 
 
Before      1 After        2 
 
 
B17. Are you aware of any South African Police Service policy on peacekeeping 
deployments? 
 
 
Yes          1 No            2 
 
B18.  How long should you wait before you can be redeployed to another peacekeeping 
mission? 
 
1 Year                                 1  
2 Years                               2      
3 Years                               3  
4 Years                               4   
5 Years                               5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B19. Are you aware of senior managers (Assistant Commissioners and above), who 
have undergone any peacekeeping training in South Africa or elsewhere?  
 
Yes          1 No           2 
 
 
B20. Do you have any plans of using your experiences from the mission when come 
back to South Africa and to what extend would you get management support on 
implementing such plans? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
 
 
 B21. If you were given another chance, would you still volunteer to go back to Sudan: 
Darfur? 
 
Yes          1 No            2 
 
 
B22. Do you think that your presence in Sudan: Darfur has added value to the lives of 
the victims of armed conflict? 
 
Great deal      1 Somewhat     2 A little          3 Not at all            4 
  
 
Thanks for taking time to complete this questionnaire. Your contribution to this end is 
highly appreciated. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
